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Introduction
Bill Shuart,
Will Spaulding,
and Jeffrey Poland
Madonna Rehabilitation Hospital;
University of Nebraska-Lincoln;
Rhode Island School of Design /
Brown University
Capturing the complexity of human behavior has been a recurring
theme in the Nebraska Symposium on Motivation:
We expect behavior to be patterned or integrated, and to make
biological sense; and so patterning and biological utility are what
we see. And of course what we see is actually there-behavior in
general is not chaotic; it is organized. (Nissen, 1954, p. 314)
When fundamental psychologists do make excursions into the
human motivational world ... it is rare that they survey the
requirements for theory or pre-theory by intensive descriptive
analysis of behavior related to such motives as produced by
concrete human beings. More remote still is the chance that
anyone will select for illustration, let alone analysis, behavior
or experience relevant to man in his most characteristically
human performances: man as he creates or loves or plays or
responds to the aesthetic surfaces of the human and natural
environment. Such matters are threateningly complex. (Koch,
1956, pp. 64-65)
I have tried, first, to show that it is possible to formulate a
meaningful theory of complex motivation by analyzing the
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sorts of variables involved, together with their interactions.
I have sought, second, to show that we possess, now, many
sound and useful concepts and techniques to translate these
complexities into productive experimental research. I suppose
the moral is: be not afraid of complexity. If motivation is indeed
complex, then let us find the means to cope with it. (Vinacke,
1962, pp. 42-43)
Through the representation of a few very simple psychological
concepts, in a rudimentary mathematical way, a good deal of
complexity can be generated .... Let us now proceed to generate complexity from simplicity. (Burke, 1966, pp. 49-50)
Although disorder may be experienced and expressed in highly
patterned processes of human activity, it is diverse, individually unique, and systemic; we shall advance in our attempts
at conceptualization and classification only as we are willing
to embrace the limits of symbol systems to capture human
uniqueness and the ultimate ineffability of complex system dynamics. (Mahoney, in this volume, pp. 265-266)
The contributions to this volume of the Symposium describe contemporary approaches to the modeling of complex psychological
and behavioral processes, ranging from molecular to molar phenomena. Although the contributions reflect a range of theoretical and
epistemic perspectives, they all explicitly or implicitly incorporate
complex frameworks of dynamic, system-like relations involving
perception, learning, concept formation, emotion, motivation, intention, behavior, and the social context in which behavior occurs.
One special feature of all the contributions from this particularly
distinguished group of theorist-practitioners is an emphasis on practical applications of the conceptual frameworks in which they work.
This reflects an important idea in the zeitgeist of the contemporary
scientific community, that of translational research. Translational research is a process of translating the principles and truths that
emerge from basic science into practical applications. The complexity of the processes captured in the contributors' models enhances
the models' applicability to the complexities of clinical practice, industry, and education. To consolidate the relevance of application
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and translational research, this volume ends with a volume editors'
postscript, describing a practical model for the complex processes of
rehabilitation, as manifest in rehabilitation services currently evolving in Nebraska.
Translational research demands, not just practical application,
but continuity with theory and basic science. This converges with
the historic role of the Nebraska Symposium as a prominent (and
now the oldest sustained) forum for psychological theory. All the
contributions in this volume emphasize the theoretical basis of application and the necessity of logical and conceptual continuity in
understanding complex processes.
In the first contribution Richard W. J. Neufeld discusses the advantages of formal mathematical theory for illuminating relations
between variables as they interact in experimental science. He applies these advantages to the clinical practice of assessing cognitive
impairments. Decrying a continuing overreliance in much psychological research on statistical analyses associated with Fisher and
Pearson, Dr. Neufeld asserts that formal mathematical modeling of
cognitive processes will, ultimately, lead to greater theoretical clarity
about normal and abnormal cognition and better clinical-assessment
techniques. It is noteworthy that, while the tradition of mathematical
modeling in psychology has a long and honored past, the increasing
availability of powerful computational tools (e.g., computers and
analytic software) supports the kind of sophisticated modeling in
the hospital or clinic that was impractical in earlier decades.
At a more general level, Dr. Neufeld characterizes his approach
as a novel form of construct validity, one based on the inherent
mathematical properties of the cognitive processes he studies. In this
sense his contribution is a sophisticated exemplar of the use of complex modeling to achieve traditional theoretical goals of experimental and clinical psychology, as articulated by such historical figures
as Lee Cronbach and Paul Meehl.
In the next contribution, Wolfgang Tschacher and Zeno Kupper
provide a synthesis of dynamic systems theory and current cognitive science. Inspired by the historic role of Gestalt psychology in
the evolution of cognitive science, their discussion invites us into the
heart of psychology's theoretical legacy. Drs. Tschacher and Kupper
then apply their perspective and methods to the complex realm of
psychopathology. They present data sets and analyses from recent
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research with people diagnosed with schizophrenia and demonstrate
the importance of tracking individuals with multiple measurements
over time in order to detect oscillations or trajectories in rehabilitation and recovery that would be missed in the typical cross-sectional
approach. Using a time-series analysis, they identify unique patterns
or dimensions of intrasubject characteristics that have complex but
meaningful interrelations. Returning to theoretical principles, they
show how complex, dynamic formulations can be translated into
useful clinical instruments and methods. Finally, in a tribute to the
Nebraska Symposium's historic focus, their contribution culminates
with a characterization of motivation as identical to the ongoing action of complex human cognitive processes operating to order and
simplify a complex world.
A second exemplar of complex modeling to achieve traditional
goals is provided by Suzanne P. Lajoie. Dr. Lajoie uses theoretically
grounded performance modeling in the development of computerbased "intelligent" tutoring systems designed to help learners master the complexities of real-world endeavors. Learning how experts
go about problem solving and decision making through "cognitivetask analysis" is an important aspect in the process of developing an
effective tutoring system. Dr. Lajoie highlights the importance of discerning experts' relevant "dimensions of expertise" (e.g., self-monitoring), as expressed in a specific context, in developing effective
models. She also emphasizes the importance of other variables, e.g.,
emotional, motivational, and social, and she describes strategies for
determining what to model, whom or what should serve as the model,
and how to model the content and/or process. She then translates
these principles into design considerations for effective educational
technology.
The next contribution extends application of complex modeling from education to knowledge management. Mark A. Musen
discusses past and current efforts to develop computer applications
to support decision making and data representation in health care.
Dr. Musen's theory base is not psychology or neuroscience but artificial intelligence. His technology is the technology of computer
engineering. Nevertheless, he envisions a future role for psychology in the development of artificially intelligent systems to manage
our already enormous and rapidly expanding knowledge base. It
is noteworthy in this regard that psychology has drawn from engi-
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neering as much as vice versa, from radar-inspired signal detection
models of perception to band-filter models of attention to computer
models of executive cognition. Herbert Simon, in his 1994 Nebraska
Symposium on Motivation contribution, cited artificial intelligence
as a promising model for human cognition. The impact of complex
models for knowledge management may be in psychology's future
rather than its past.
In the next contribution, Eduardo Salas, Kevin C. Stagl, C. Shawn
Burke, and Gerald F. Goodwin scrutinize complex processes associated with small groups of people brought together for common purposes. They advance "the science of teams" by providing a detailed
review of representative models of team performance in organizations and other naturalistic settings generated over the past quarter
century. In their review, Drs. Salas, Stagl, Burke, and Goodwin find
the invocation of input-process-output (IPO) models, consonant with
the "general systems" framework that has influenced many areas
in the social sciences during the past several decades, to be a key
commonality among these models. There is greater diversity among
models with respect to emphasis on internal team processes versus
greater attention to the influence of external, contextual factors. The
authors conclude that both influences are important and that, consequently, more sophisticated modeling techniques are needed to successfully deal with the resulting dynamic complexity, particularly in
naturalistic settings.
Drs. Salas, Stagl, Burke, and Goodwin then turn to a description
and elaboration of a new and unique multilevel integrative framework for understanding team functioning. This new model is distinctive in the importance that it attaches to individual team members' cognition as an important moderating variable as well as group
decision making, shared mental models, and external factors.
Michael J. Mahoney's contribution is a nuanced interlacing of
several kinds of "models," including verbal metaphor, narrative,
photography, and poetry. Dr. Mahoney discuses various perspectives on "complexity" theory and its precursors in philosophy and
science, including current theoretical frameworks such as dynamic
systems theory, complexity studies, and chaos theory, placing them
in the context of the history of ideas. He describes and elaborates on
constructivism, an integrative framework and family of theories. Dr.
Mahoney'S contribution includes two appendices. The first provides
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a synopsis of important aspects of human change from the perspective of constructivism. The second provides rich and provocative
perspectives for incorporation in the practice of counseling, psychotherapy, coaching, and other educational pursuits.

Complexity, Systems, and the Nebraska Symposium on
Motivation: A Brief History of Ideas
The perspectives reflected in this volume are exemplars of an evolving set of conceptual frameworks that influenced thinking in many
areas of science during the second half of the 20th century. These
frameworks are most generally associated with general systems theory,
and addressing complexity is one of their key common features.
Having recently celebrated a half century of the Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, as this volume's editors we saw a useful purpose in reviewing the more than 300 individual contributions that
constitute the previous volumes, to identify ideas that anticipate or
shape the approaches to complexity that we find in contemporary
work. We found a richness of such ideas, so many that only a few
can be highlighted here. The remainder of our introduction to this
volume is a review of five especially resonant contributions from
volumes past: Heider (1960), Walker (1964), Leeper (1965), Newcomb (1953), and Barker (1960). We selected contributions that, in
addition to showing the nascent ideas about complexity and systems
theory discussed in this volume's contributions, have clear relevance
to practical application and translational research and especially to
our own particular interests in physical medicine and psychiatric rehabilitation.
One common characteristic of systems theories is an organizational scheme that orders specific mechanisms and processes according to their respective complexity. Two terms from classic learning
theory, molar and molecular, serve to define the poles of these schemes.
Processes and mechanisms are molar rather than molecular to the
degree that they represent the integrated interaction of multiple
components. Psychology itself reflects this type of ordering, ranging
as it does from theories of neuronal activity to neuropsychology to
the psychology of social cognition and interpersonal behavior. The
historical Nebraska Symposium contributions reviewed here follow
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a molecular to molar rather than a chronological sequence. Interestingly, contributions from common theoretical perspectives can differ
with respect to the molecular-molar dimension. Heider (1960) and
Barker (1960) integrate classic Gestalt principles with subsequent
theories, but Heider addresses comparatively molecular expressions
of key processes, while Barker is at the other end of the continuum,
addressing "spontaneous" organizational processes at the level of
a human community. Other contributions to be reviewed address
system organizational processes at the cognitive level (Walker, 1964),
the emotional level (Leeper, 1965), and at the social/interpersonal
level (Newcomb, 1953).
We have included extended excerpts from the original contributions, in an effort to preserve the style and tone of the original
presentation. Also, we hope to provide enough of the language in
sufficient detail for readers to draw their own conclusions about the
relation of the historic ideas to those of the present volume. However, these passages cannot fully convey the logic or the eloquence
of the source materials. The reader is encouraged to consult the full
chapters in areas of particular interest.

Fritz Heider (1960)
Many Symposium contributions have included Gestalt psychology
frameworks offering concepts and models that resonate with contemporary perspectives (e.g., self-organizing systems) that, in many
cases, evolved from earlier, traditional Gestalt investigators. An exemplary illustration is Fritz Heider's "The Gestalt theory of motivation" (1960).
Heider's work has been more influential on certain theorists than
the relative paucity of scientific citations would indicate. George S.
Klein, then editor of the journal Psychological Issues (itself representative
of the rise of interest in ego functioning in the psychoanalytic literature
the 1940s and 1950s), provides a brief preface to a set of selected papers published as Fritz Heider's monograph On Perception, Event Structure, and the Psychological Environment (1959). In addition to describing
Heider's unique viewpoint, Klein's comments highlight important aspects of the view of rehabilitation and the notion of participation as an
important goal of rehabilitation (World Health Organization, 2001). The
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ideas presented have direct relevance to current models of rehabilitation and crucial aspects of participation and quality of life, each intimately associated with the behavior settings available to the individual,
the quality of his or her social networks, and other variables that will be
discussed in the final section of this introduction.
According to Klein (1959): "Fritz Heider's work ... has had over
the years a significant, if relatively unobtrusive, impact on some of
the most important theorists of our time, notably Kurt Koffka, Kurt
Lewin, and Egon Brunswik. More recently, Heider's influence has
been detectable in perception theory, for example, in the work of
James Gibson. Still, his writings cannot be called 'popular'" (p. v).
Klein continues:
Heider's emphasis on the "macrophysics" of things (in contrast
to the reductionist emphasis on microphysics), the important
distinction he develops between those parts of the environment which mediate ("medium") and those which are mediated ("thing"), his analysis of how we may distinguish behavioral events attributable to the structure of the environment and
those attributable to the structure of the perceptual system-all
of these merit close study....
Throughout the papers the composition of a "unit"whether spatial, temporal, or causal-is of central importance
to Heider's distinction between "thing" and "medium." The
defining properties of a "unit," therefore, come in for extended
and penetrating analysis ....
Heider has made [an attempt] to penetrate the essential nature of the concept of structure. The general macrostructures
which he describes may apply to their subjective counterparts
in ego organization....
A unique feature of Heider's approach is his attempt to
fathom environmental structure not from the response sidefrom the inside outward, as it were, as is common in psychological theories-but from the outside inward, that is, by
specifying the architectural rules of the extrapersonal world of
physical object and event units. The result, then, is an extraordinarily fresh confrontation of the external structures which
are assumed but never specified in psychoanalytic notions of
reality testing and adaptation. (p. vii)
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In his Symposium contribution Heider provides an overview
of four "thought models or schemata" characterizing the Gestalt
tradition at the time. Heider terms the initial model the classic Gestalt theory. The model is based on the work of investigators such
as Wertheimer, Kohler, and Koffka. Describing this model, Heider
highlights a number of aspects of this perspective that bring to mind
such concepts as patterning and perceptual organizing processes that
seem quite consistent with concepts used today. Heider begins by
emphasizing the Gestalt concept of good figure, advanced by Wertheimer, who applied it to visual processing:
This principle states that the perceived figure tends to be as
good as the stimulus pattern will allow, or as Koffka says: "Psychological organization will always be as 'good' as the prevailing conditions allow. In this definition, 'good' is undefined. It
embraces such properties as regularity, symmetry, simplicity
and others .... " For instance, slight irregularities in the shape
of visual forms are usually not noticed. Kohler gives the following example: Faces of people usually appear to us symmetrical,
in spite of the fact that they are rarely objectively symmetrical.
We may notice this irregularity in another person's face when
we look at his mirror image; but ordinarily we don't see it.
Kohler has called attention to the fact that a tendency towards simplicity can also be observed in physical systems, as,
for instance, Ernst Mach has pointed out. Kohler gives many
examples in his book on Physical Gestalten [1924] ....
Let us recapitulate: Wertheimer observed the tendency
toward good form with percepts; Kohler then related this observation to a similar tendency found in physical systems. Of
course the same tendency is then assumed to rule the process
in the physiological brain field. Since isomorphism is assumed,
all this fits very well together.
The thought model is one of a complex process with many
part events which interact in such a way that a certain endstate is reached, an end-state which is in some way distinguished, and which has characteristics the other possible states
do not have; as long as this end-state is not reached something
will happen. On the other hand, when it is reached, the process attains an equilibrium and nothing more will happen.
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Furthermore, the end-state will come about regardless of what
the beginning state of the system is: thus one can talk about a
tendency, which implies direction, a reaching of the same endstate by different routes. (Heider, 1960, pp. 145-146)
Heider follows his discussion of Kohler's ideas with a perspective from Kurt Koffka:
It is not surprising that Gestalt psychologists have applied this
same thought model to behavior. For instance, Koffka does so
in his book on The Growth of the Mind, which first appeared in
1921. I should mention that Koffka uses the term "closure" for
the distinguished end-state, a closed figure being a better figure
than an open one. Tendency to closure is therefore only another
name for tendency toward simplicity, or goodness of figure.
This is what Koffka says (Koffka, 1925, p. 103):

... The characteristics of closure ... belong not merely
to the phenomena themselves, but likewise to the behavior taken as a whole, including all reactions made to the
environment. Instinctive activity then becomes an objective mode of behavior analogous to such phenomena as
rhythm, melody, and figure .
. . . He [Kohler] calls the state toward which the processes
in the organism are directed a "standard state." It has to be distinguished from the state of equilibrium (Kohler, 1938, p. 325),
and he describes it as follows (Kohler, 1938, p. 303):
The essential characteristic of regulation is an invariance
of direction. Whatever initial configuration may obtain in
those systems when we begin to observe them-if we observe long enough their inner displacements or transformations will always be found to bring them nearer to a
standard status. The word "standard" points here to the
fact that the final status is independent of the initial configuration .
. . . Essentially ... the thought model of a system tending
towards a standard state is applied to directed action, and this
model had its origin in the principle of good figure. However,
... when we try to find out how it is carried out, we see that
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two steps are necessary for the transition from the phenomena
of the visual field to action.
First, we have to take into account not merely perceptual
appearances but a space in which behavior occurs; and secondly, we have to consider the objective environment, and the
way the organism effects changes in it.
... Thus we have to substitute for the visual field what
Koffka called the behavioral field and Lewin the life space.
This behavioral field is conceived of as having similarities with
the visual field. It also is a system containing a great number
of part processes which interact, it exhibits forces and tensions,
and tends to arrange itself in such a way that a distinguished
end-state is reached. This distinguished end-state, in some way
comparable to the simple figure, is the state of the person who
has reached the goal in his life space. Now, this life space or behavioral field is a concept which involves many difficulties and
unsuspected depths and snares .... I can only say that in a first
approximation, which, however, is not entirely correct, one can
conceive of it as representing the environment of the person as
the person himself experiences it-and it is in some way related
to the brain field, to physical processes going on in the brain.
The Gestalt psychologist would characterize this relation as one
of isomorphism, i.e., of structural similarity. This is the first step
we have to accept when we apply the principle of good form to
activity: namely, the step from perceptual to behavioral field.
The second step requires a more extensive consideration. So
far we have only considered processes which are "inside" the
organism in some way, which are "encapsulated," as Brunswik
says. How is it possible that they produce effects outside the organism, in his physical environment? We assume that this behavioral field changes in the direction of a distinguished state,
maybe a state of minimal tension, i.e., the state of the person
being at the goal. But ... we have to understand how the tension in the behavioral field makes the person reach the goal in
reality. (Heider, 1960, pp. 147-149)
He later continues:
In action, not only a part of the organism, but the whole organism is involved .... The idea of the feedback or circular process
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can be applied also in this case: as long as the person has not
yet reached the goal, there is a tension in the behavioral field;
this tension is communicated to the executive system, which
changes the relation between organism and objective environment in such a way that the goal is reached; via perception this
objective state is communicated to the behavioral field; and
thus the tension in this field is removed. I have used the term
"feedback" to characterize this process. However, one has to
keep in mind that this circular process is not a simple feedback
process. What distinguishes the circular process of Gestalt theory from simple feedback is the interpolation of the behavioral
field with its tendency towards a distinguished state [emphasis
added]. (p. 150)
Heider goes on to describe two models advanced by Kurt
Lewin-the person model and the environment model, together constituting what Heider terms Lewin's spatialized psychology. He notes the
move from the perceptual sphere to the behavioral realm in Koffka's
work and what Lewin terms the life space. Heider's discussion of
Lewin's concepts is thought provoking, and the reader is encouraged to review those concepts in the source material.
Heider then offers a relatively brief summary of his own recent
theorizing, describing what he calls his balance theory, which he feels
answers some questions left inadequately treated by the classic Gestalt theories he has summarized:
This theory of balance deals mainly with configurations consisting of a number of entities between which exist certain relations. The entities can be persons-the own person or other
persons-and other entities, as for instance, things, situations,
or groups. The relations considered are mainly of two sorts: on
the one hand attitudes of liking or disliking, and on the other
hand unit relations of belonging. The main idea is that certain
of these configurations are preferred, and that, if circumstances
allow, they will be realized by the person either in such a mental reorganization as wishful thinking, or in an actual change
through action ....
In recent times a number of theories have been proposed
which are similar to the one just outlined. I remind you, for
instance, of Newcomb's (1953) discussion of processes of com-
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munication [see below] .... These conceptions, symmetry, consonance, balance, and simplicity, are, of course, implied in that
idea with which Gestalt theory started and which always was
central to it, namely, the idea of a 'good' figure. We therefore
have returned to the model we considered first. This model implies a number of different entities with certain properties and
standing in certain relations, which make up a constellation of
factors tending toward a standard state.
The properties of these configurations which determine
their meaning and their fate are whole-qualities. Consonance
or simplicity of the structure cannot be derived from the properties of the parts ...
If we study the p-o-x system! which is composed of the own
person (p), another person (0), and an impersonal entity (x),
then we find that the state of balance depends on the attitudes
of p toward 0 or x. That is, the attitudes toward the parts of the
configuration, and the relation of these attitudes to each other
enter as significant factors, and determine the attitude toward
the whole configuration ....

Thus, we are able to specify more exactly the conditions of goal
selection, at least in some cases. The goal is not taken to be an lmanalyzed entity which in some way acquired valence, but is derived from
the properties of the structure [emphasis added] .
. . . [The] difference between Lewinian theory and balance
theory [is] in regard to the role structure plays. In Lewin's environment model ... structure is not intimately connected with
the conditions of tendencies, nor with their effects. Structure
helps us to derive the direction toward means from direction
toward goal; but it does not help us to derive the direction to
the goal. ...
. . . Thus we see that in these [Lewin's] models the dynamic
factors are not very closely linked with structure. Neither do
the properties of the structure imply forces, nor do the forces
affect the structure in a specifiable way.
In the balance model the dynamic factors are intimately
connected with the structure. The dynamic factors arise out of
definable structural characteristics and the forces toward the
standard state tend to change the structure in definite directions.
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... [Unlike Lewin's models], in the balance model structure in a state of equilibrium is definably different from one in
a state of disequilibrium, and all the parts of the structure are
relevant to this difference, not only the relation between two
parts, person and goal. (Heider, 1960, pp. 167-170)

Edward L. Walker (1964)
Edward Walker's contribution to the 1964 Symposium, entitled
"Psychological complexity as a basis for a theory of motivation and
choice," is generally congruent with Heider's (1960) views, though
the terminology employed by these scholars and the associated research traditions from which they come are quite different. Walker
(1964) provides a concrete example of model building as well as an
interesting perspective on the concept of complexity and mechanisms
that contribute to the organization and self-regulation of behavior at
the level of the organism. Also, as with Heider's view, mechanisms
of perception, cognition, learning, adaptation, and motivation are all
seen as quite interdependent and quite closely related to environmental stimulus context.
Walker states at the outset:
This paper is an attempt to state what J believe to be the most
basic questions of behavior theory, to elaborate the concept of
psychological complexity as a potentially unifying concept, and
to test its clarifying contributions with respect to some critical
problems of behavior theory.
The three basic questions of behavior theory are ...
1. What is the mechanism that terminates an event?
2. What are the determinants of the next event?
3. What is the fate of an event after it is terminated? (Walker,
1964, pp. 48-49)
He follows precedent in setting the temporal length of a psychological event at 0.5 seconds. Then he asks:
When an event is terminated, what are the determinants of the
next event? A great many subareas of psychology are devoted
to an effort to discover and quantify the determinants of choice
behavior.... "Habit," "motive," "subjective probability," "util-
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ity/' "set," "attitude," and "trait," along with many other concepts in psychology, are reducible to names of intervening variables or theoretical constructs, each related to different sets of
operations, but all, ultimately, determiners of choice behavior.
It will be the argument of this paper that the concept of
psychological complexity can be used to account for the termination of psychological events, and the choice of the next
event over a wide range of traditional concepts of determiners
of choice. Thus, the concept of psychological complexity can be
useful in answering the first two of the three basic questions.
Psychological complexity can also be used to account for many
of the phenomena associated with the trace of a past event, but
this third basic question or problem is beyond the scope of the
present paper. (pp. 51-52)
Under the subheading "Psychological Complexity Theory,"
Walker asserts:
The major distinction that must be made is between "stimulus
complexity" on the one hand and "psychological complexity"
on the other. The first is a characteristic of the external stimulus, more or less independent of the individual organism.
Psychological complexity is a characteristic of the event itself,
the organism's response. Psychological complexity and neural
process complexity will be assumed to be completely isomorphic. (Walker, 1964, pp. 52-53)
In the context of a basic definition of terms, he turns to an elaboration of his concept of psychological complexity:
Psychological complexity is a characteristic of the event itself
and is thus a characteristic of the interaction of the organism
with the distal stimulus when the event in question is initiated
by a stimulus. Thus it is possible for two organisms to react
with equal psychological complexity to stimuli with very different distal stimulus complexity values. The same organism
may also react with different degrees of psychological complexity at different times to the same stimulus. (pp. 54-55)
Walker offers a brief description of the (assumed) underlying
nervous system basis of the experience of optimal complexity, under
the heading "Neural Net or Neural Process Complexity":
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Underlying any psychological event, is, of course, a pattern of
neural events. Such events are spatially three dimensional and
occur over a finite period of time, a fourth dimension. It is assumed that variation can occur in the relative complexities of
two neural processes. We shall refer to the relative complexity
of a four-dimensional neural process as the relative complexity of the relevant neural net. Furthermore, we shall assume
a complete isomorphism between neural net complexity and
psychological complexity (Walker, 1964, p. 55).
He offers as relative characteristics of simple versus complex neural net in terms of the four dimensions noted above: "simple" nets
consist of processes that are relatively "small," "short," "focal," and
"central" (i.e., origin within the central nervous system); "complex"
nets are relatively "large," "long," "diffuse," and "peripheral."
Having offered a neurologically oriented substrate, Walker turns
to the concept of psychological complexity itself. Under the heading
"Optimal Complexity," he asserts:
The key concept of the theory I am attempting to fabricate is the
concept of optimal complexity. The simplest and most straight
forward psychological definition of optimal complexity is the
following: Optimal complexity is that degree of psychological complexity the organism will seek to maintain.
If a psychological event is more complex than the optimum,
the organism will behave in such a manner as to reduce the
complexity of the event. If a psychological event is less complex than the optimum, then the organism will behave in such
a manner as to increase the complexity of the event.
Optimal complexity can be bracketed by other values of
psychological complexity. In perception, an input level far above
optimum produces "mental dazzle." A lower limit is a level of
complexity that is below the threshold of consciousness. In motor activity, psychological complexity far above optimum results in discoordinated tetany, and there is a lower value which
constitutes the threshold for action. The optimum is a "normal"
percept or a smoothly coordinated movement. ...
The sequence is inevitable and the fall in neural net complexity is an automatic result of observable and fairly well understood neurophysiological characteristics. Since neural net
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complexity and psychological complexity are assumed to be
isomorphic, psychological complexity may be said to rise and
fall as well. With a sufficiently complex stimulus, psychological
complexity will rise to and exceed the threshold of consciousness, will rise to and exceed optimal complexity, will fall below optimal complexity, will then drop below the threshold of
consciousness automatically, and will usually be followed by
another psychological event.
[The reader] will recall that the first of the three basic questions of behavior theory was:

What is the mechanism which terminates an event?
The answer is:

Whether the stimulus for an event is continued or not, a psychological event undergoes a sharp and automatic drop in complexity during a period of approximately one-half second after
its initiation. (Walker, 1964, pp. 56-58)
With respect to repeated activation of an event, he asserts:

Repeated activation of a neural net will result in a progressive decrease in the psychological complexity of the event involved. (p. 59)
With respect to the second major question (What are the determinants of the choice of the next event?), he continues:
The principle of optimal complexity incorporates the dynamism that the organism will seek such a level. The termination
of one event occasioned by the automatic reduction in its psychological complexity below the optimum level, literally forces
choice of that event among available next events which will be
nearest optimum. Therefore:

Among available alternatives, an organism will choose as a next
event that activity which is nearest optimal psychological complexity.
It is assumed as a working hypothesis that many of the

major determinants of choice behavior such as reinforcement,
habit, motivation, curiosity and other collative2 variables, subjective probability and utility, and others ultimately can be reduced to a single concept-psychological complexity. (p. 60)
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Walker offers a brief recapitulation:
The theory can be stated in an abbreviated form. During the
course of a psychological event that has a duration of approximately 500 [msec], the psychological complexity of the event
rises abruptly and falls more slowly. The automatic reduction
in the psychological complexity of an event insures that it will
drop promptly below the optimum to be replaced by that one of
the available alternative events which is nearest optimum. The
psychological complexity of alternative behaviors or events
will be a function of four variables. They are: (1) the stimulus
complexity of the initiation stimulus; (2) the time since this particular event has occurred previously; (3) the number of times
that event had occurred before; (4) the arousal properties of the
stimulus or event. (Walker, 1964, p. 60)
Walker addresses the issue of what behavior(s) might be expected
when no near-optimum event is present. In the case of all available
alternatives below optimum, an individual might commonly respond
in one or more ways (slightly adapting Walker's text):
1. Search the environment or his own repertory for more

complex events;
2. Find a more complex stimulus in the environment to
which he had not attended previously, or he might fall
to daydreaming;
3. React by locomoting, getting up and moving about;
4. Seek arousing stimuli;
5. Seek to differentiate previously unexplored potential
complexity in his environment or in old thought sequences and problems.
All of these devices would serve to increase the complexity
level of the sequences of events which are occurring. All would
serve to move the sequence nearer an optimal level of complexity. (Walker, 1964, p. 61)
At the other extreme:
Situations in which the psychological complexity levels are
above optimum are usually situations in which the sensory inputs into the nervous system are providing more information
than the organism can process. This may result when the exter-
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nal environment is too complex, when the problem one is working [on] is beyond immediate solution, or when the motivational
or emotional system is in a highly aroused state. (pp. 61-62)
In such circumstances, he notes common reactions:
1. The organism may shift attention or narrow attention to a
limited portion of the stimulus input;
2. If the overload is of external origin, the organism may locomote to a less complex circumstance;
3. If either are difficult or impossible, the organism may attend
repeatedly to the same stimulus in an effort, usually successful,
to produce a reduction in the psychological complexity of the
situation through repeated activation of the relevant event;
4. An associated result of repeated activation is to organize a
very complex stimulus into a smaller number of "chunks."
(p.62)
Walker's contribution concludes with a survey and critique of
relevant research and theoretical distinctions to provide support for
and elucidation of the conceptual framework adduced therein. He
buttresses his concept by applying it to existing experimental data
that are not easily explainable by any other existing theory. For example, he applies his theory of optimal psychological complexity to
the often-observed (but less frequently reported) decremental variations in "conditioned responses" following "learning" experiments
that have been taken by many to be unexplainable anomalies. After
noting a few such "anomalous" observations:
For the sake of the argument I am certain to get, let me take the
position that the appropriate "learning" curve shape in running
studies, conditioning studies, and selective learning studies, is
one that rises and falls to zero or to a steady level below the
maximum performance. The curve that rises to a steady maximum and remains there indefinitely is likely to be rare. The
reason that we see few "learning" curves of the postulated type
is that most experimenters know in advance what a learning
curve is supposed to look like. As a result of this knowledge,
they stop training when the" asymptote" is reached, or, if they
obtain a curve which does not fit their conception of what one
should look like, they find a great many other ways to respond
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... other than to publish their sin against respectability. They
throwaway their data. They restructure the apparatus. They
change the parameters of the study. They change the design.
This process is known as the establishment of experimental(er)
control. Sooner or later they manage a situation in which they
obtain the "right" answer. I can attest that this process is carried
out in good faith and under the assumption that in so doing,
one is behaving like a sound, rigorous, and careful experimentalist. I can attest to this because I am one of the sinners.
Thus psychological complexity theory handles the usual
learning curve, extinction, and the drop in performance that often occurs under continued reinforcement. It predicts that most
experimental situations will produce a drop in performance if
training is continued. (Walker, 1964, pp. 85-86)
In later comments concerning Walker's presentation, his fellow
presenter, Frank Logan, in addition to suggesting caveats to the former's views, concludes with an important observation:
There are several features of Walker's approach with which I am
in strong agreement. A language that avoids the artificial separation of stimuli and responses more nearly captures the unified,
interdependent inseparability of psychological events. It is also
becoming increasingly recognized that the fundamental behavioral operation of an organism is selection or choice .... Walker's
attempt to develop a system that can deal with behavior dynamically, i.e., continuously over time, is perhaps the critical feature
necessary to achieve a general integration. And, by whatever
means, visualizing such disparate concepts as habit, motivation,
and decision-making in terms of a single construct certainly is
one we should applaud. (Logan, 1964, p. 98)

Robert Ward Leeper (1965)
Robert Leeper's contribution, "Some needed developments in
the motivational theory of emotions" (1965), is focused on urging
greater attention to understanding emotions as motivational factors,
rather than "lower," simply "energizing" or "arousing" factors that
are then guided by "higher-order" functions (e.g., perception and/

xxix

Introduction
or cognition). In fact, Leeper highlights the ultimately inseparability
of processes of perception, motivation, and emotion:
Still earlier, David Krech (1949, 195Ga, 195Gb, 1951), in his
usual impassioned style, had reasoned that it is unrealistic
to conceive of psychological phenomena in terms of separate
processes of perception, motivation and learning. Instead, he
urged, we ought merely to conceive of "Dynamic Systems."
These, he said, are so definitely organic unities that no single
aspect of such a system can be changed without changing the
other aspects as well-we have been dealing in myths in believing that we could vary some one of these aspects while
keeping the other aspects constant. Though proposing a less
drastic statement on this point, E. C. Tolman (1932, 1948) had
been suggesting some perceptual factors in motivation in his
view that motivation is partly a matter of reward expectations
and punishment expectations. Kurt Lewin similarly had been
discussing many problems of motivation in terms of factors in
the organism's "psychological environment." ... In my own
previous writing, my original paper on a motivational theory
of emotion (1948) was extended to some extent into the perceptual-motivational theory which has been elaborated in the
present paper....
One odd fact about these various earlier discussions of a
perceptual or conceptual interpretation of motivation is that
their authors have made practically no references to the related
ideas of the other papers. This is the more surprising in view of
the fact that most of this group are more or less closely related
to one another both personally and as regards their general theoretical outlooks and interests. It seems, therefore, as though
each of these persons had to grope to the concept on his own,
even though possibly helped in ways that he did not recognize by his predecessors or colleagues. I make this suggestion
with somewhat more confidence because I remember that, in
my own case, when I first read Krech's papers on "Dynamic
Systems," they did not make much sense for me .... And, peculiarly, it took me a long time to recognize that Lewin's ideas
might be thought of as a perceptual theory of emotion ....
Maybe this sort of thing will continue to be the case. If a
perceptual theory of motivation is to become more common,
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perhaps each psychologist will have to figure it out for himself.
(Leeper, 1965, pp. 111-112)
Leeper summarizes some major themes:
The suggestion that comes from a number of sources, therefore,
is, first of all, that emotions are motives, and then, second, that
emotional processes, along with all other motives, are perceptual or representational processes. The suggestion that comes is
that emotions and other motives do not exist or operate in any
less complex sense than this ....
Even though perceptual habits are hard to change in some
cases ... it seems that all perceptual habits can be modified by
learning and that sometimes such modifications can occur suddenly and dramatically. If emotional habits are perceptual habits, these same possibilities should exist for them. (pp. 113, 115)

Theodore Newcomb (1953)
Theodore Newcomb's contribution, to the very first volume of the
Symposium, was "Motivation in social behavior" (1953). Newcomb
makes clear that he does not believe that a psychology of motivation in
social situations should be fundamentally different or discrepant from
a general psychology of motivation. Rather, it should be subsumed by
a broader model of motivation that describes human motivation in
any situation. However, he also notes that the breadth of such an overarching model would not lend itself to making predictions or heighten
understanding of specific processes or variables within a particular
subdomain of psychology in general (e.g., individual behavior in a
learning situation; behavior in a social situation):
A general theory, whether of motivation or of evolution of species, is never specific enough to predict within a specific area
those details in which we are often most interested. Indeed, it
is from the relatively limited theories that the relatively inclusive theories must in the long run emerge. (Newcomb, 1953, p.
139)
The relevance of his contribution to the topic of self-organized systems is seen in his analysis of the dynamics or organization of communicative behavior in an interpersonal context.
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Newcomb goes on to define terms and delimit his focus to communicative behavior between individuals:
The properties of objects may be studied either objectively or
phenomenally-preferably in both ways-but in any case, they
are studied not as things-in-themselves, but as related to persons.
Thus the characteristic way in which social psychologists study
motivation is in terms of person-object relationships (the term
"object" includes other persons, of course). Since, as we have all
learned in recent years, motivational phenomena are intimately
interlinked with perceptual phenomena, it is often necessary to
distinguish two aspects of person-object relationships, which
may be labeled the cathetic and the cognitive. Often, however,
one does not need to make this distinction, while still bearing
in mind that both aspects are involved, and in such instances
the term "orientation" is a useful one. The term is similar to the
concept of "attitude," except that it connotes "existing directedness" and not merely a predisposition or a readiness.
Orientations are known, of course, only as they are inferred
from observable behavior. Insofar as such behavior involves
reciprocal stimulation and response (or anticipations thereof)
it is traditionally referred to as "interaction." But one cannot
observe interaction-in-general; one must observe discriminable
units of behavior. I propose, therefore, to use as such an interaction unit the communicative act, defined as any observable
behavior by which information, consisting of discriminative
stimuli, is transmitted from a human source to a human recipient. For present purposes, it is assumed that the discriminative
stimuli have an object as referent. Thus in the simplest possible
communicative act, one person (A) transmits information to
another person (B) about something (X).
Human social behavior is thus to be studied in terms of
the conditions and consequences of varying communicative
acts. And problems of motivation in social behavior are to be
studied in terms of orientations toward the two kinds of objects necessarily involved in communicative acts-i.e., persons
as recipients of transmitted information and objects (including
persons) as referents of transmitted information. The relationship
between orientations and communicative acts, as we shall see, is a
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circular one, so that it will be necessary to consider each of them,
in turn, as varying with the other [emphasis added]. (Newcomb,
1953, pp. 140-141)
Following a second section summarizing relevant findings concerning group membership, orientations, and communication, Newcomb moves to a section titled "Communicative Behavior as Varying
with Orientation toward Persons and toward Objects." In this section
he explicates the systemic relations between communicative acts and
the orientations of individuals in a communication setting:
I can hardly imagine anything that would surprise you less
than to hear that communicative acts are learned in ways that
seem to have something to do with rewards and punishments.
I shall stop, however, only to indicate in the most general kind
of way what seems to be the nature of the learning conditions
of communicative behavior. These conditions have to do with
what I have already referred to as the individual's necessity
for co-orientation-i.e., relating himself simultaneously both to
objects and to persons as actually or potentially related to those
objects ....
We may start with the assumption that orientations both
toward persons as potential co-communicators and toward
other objects have adaptive value; not to be oriented to them
would mean to have no cognitive content regarding them and
to have no "hypotheses" (in the Postman-Bruner sense) as to
their potentialities for reward or punishment. The further assumption that co-orientation has adaptive value stems from
what I believe to be the fact that neither kind of orientation occurs singly and independently of the other, in connection with
communicative acts. First, the orientation of any communicator, A, toward B, a potential recipient of his communication,
rarely, if ever, occurs in an objectless vacuum ....
Secondly, and conversely, the orientation of the communicator, A, toward almost any conceivable X rarely, if ever, occurs
in the total absence of an orientation toward B, the potential
recipient of his communication. ("Autistic" verbalization, of
the kind Pia get reports in young children, would, of course,
represent an exception ... ). The very fact that B is a potential
recipient requires some kind of orientation toward him .... AI-
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most invariably, moreover, there is included in this orientation
toward B some assumption-however accurate or inaccurateabout B's orientation toward the object of communication.
From this elaboration of what is perhaps only too obvious,
I want to deduce a single point-that there is a necessary interdependence between co-orientation (which itself involves an
interdependence of orientations) and communicative acts ....
Since, according to these assumptions, there are relationships of interdependence among several distinguishable orientations, it is convenient to regard them as together constituting
a system. For some purposes the system is best treated as an
objective one-i.e., a model employed by the observer. The elements in this system are, minimally, A, B and X (a source, a
recipient and an object of communication); the interdependent
orientations among them are A's toward B and toward X, and
B's toward A and toward X....
The implications of this model are: (1) that while at any
given moment the system may be conceived of as being "at
rest," it is characterized not by the absence but by the balance of
forces; and (2) that a change in any part of the system may lead
to changes in any of the others. I shall make one further set of
assumptions about the system.... These assumptions are that
(under the stated conditions) communication tends to result in
increased similarity, or congruence, of A's and B's orientations
toward X, and that, as a result of learning, communicative acts
are instigated by the anticipation of increased similarity or congruence (or, alternatively, by the threat of decreased similarity
or congruence). (Newcomb, 1953, pp. 147-149)
After positing adaptive advantages of his concept of congruence, he
goes on to articulate an important aspect of his" A-B-X" system,
which he considers a "strain toward congruence" (p. 149).
The systemic perspective of Newcomb's contribution and his
initial observations of the relation between explanations/models at
the level of subareas of psychology concludes with a view to the future:
I should like to suggest (with a good deal of tentativeness)
that something along the lines of the framework of co-orientation which I have roughly sketched out may find a place in
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general motivation theory. Many, among the higher forms of
animal life, at least, are capable of plural orientation, and the
actual direction of behavior at any given moment often cannot
be accounted for in terms of any single object-orientation, others being held experimentally or hypothetically constant. ... I
suspect that the study of social behavior can provide evidence,
in ways other behavior cannot, of how behavior directedness
varies with multiple orientations. If so, an adequate theory of
motivated social behavior will have contributed something to
a general theory.
Last, and far from least, an adequate general theory would
take fuller account than it does today of self-orientation....
Here, as in the case of other concepts of peculiar relevance to
social motivation, it is my belief that more extrapolations from
a general theory will not suffice. Theorists from McDougall
and Freud to Murphy and Rogers have properly accorded to
the self a central place; though not always, in my judgment,
have all of them seen that place in its full social context. Not
only are self-orientations part and parcel of other-orientations,
I would insist; they are inextricable from the eternal triangle
of self, other persons, and the common environment. A general theory of motivation, when it is mature enough to include
these interdependent orientations, will have borrowed from a
theory of motivation in social behavior, as well as helping to
establish it. (Newcomb, 1953, p. 159)

Roger Barker (1960)
Roger Barker's contribution, "Ecology and motivation" (1960), includes an account of alteration of individual state(s) as a function
of external, higher-order patterns or change. Like Heider and Newcomb, Barker underscores the necessity of taking individual and environment into account as a unit in any thorough analysis of behavior, and, hence, his contribution advances themes consistent with the
conceptual frameworks advanced at the 2004 Symposium. Barker's
conceptual framework is like that of Heider (1960) and Kurt Lewin's
concepts of field and life space (Lewin, 1938). This provides an intellectual context in which to consider the importance of taking both in-
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dividual and environment into account. At a practical level, this resonates with major themes in rehabilitation, for example, the World
Health Organization's recent emphasis on the construct participation
as the ultimate aim of rehabilitation efforts (see World Health Organization, 2001). This construct is of importance because it underscores the importance of including assessment and modification of
an environment, in addition to clinical treatment, as a vital part of the
rehabilitation process.
Barker outlines features of his concept of psychological ecology,
including the central concept of behavior settings, which provides an
important window on our understanding of a range of psychological phenomena as a "system" and is, at times, a very useful unit of
analysis for psychology. The relevance of Barker's concepts for the
issues addressed in the present volume is that, like Newcomb (1953),
Barker describes a framework that explicitly relates systems concepts
to adaptive processes at the social! community level.
Barker begins by incorporating from the work of Egon Brunswik
an emphasis on the critical importance of including in accounts of
perception and behavior the environment in which an individual
acts and perceives. In Barker's words:
Brunswik (1955) described psychological schools and theories
in terms of their positions upon a macro-unit he considered to
be the true vein of psychological ore. This vein extends from
the environment to the environment; namely, from distal objects in the ecological environment, through proximal stimuli
at the receptor surfaces of a person, through the person's peripheral receptor mechanisms, through his central processes,
and through his peripheral effector systems, to his proximal
reactions, or means behavior; and it finally terminates in the
focus of the total unit: the person's achievement with respect to
the nonpsychological world of things. The three major sectors
of this unit are ... (1) the ecological sector of objects and physical stimuli (preperceptual), (2) the organism or intrapersonal
sector, and (3) the behavioral sector which occurs, again, in the
ecological environment. (Barker, 1960, p. 1)
Barker, along with Brunswik, regards the entire span of the E-E
(environment-environment) unit as the fundamental unit of analysis with respect to psychology; it is "the basic psychological entity."
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He takes issue with some of Brunswik's conclusions, advancing the
hope that taking the entire E-E span into account can lead to more
than a probabilistic framework for psychological explanations:
I hold the hope that a more detailed, conceptual, and explanatory account of the whole course of events can be achieved,
particularly at the junction point between the ecological and
the intrapersonal sectors of the unit, and especially with respect
to motivation. This, in fact, is the theme of my paper. (Barker,
1960, p. 3)
The E-E unit, then, is to be taken as the ultimate unit of analysis;
one obvious way to understand this unit is as a multisectored system.
As can be seen in the material reproduced below, one theme that
recurs in other examples of systems approaches is that of the close
relation between the processes of change, perception, and motivation. A second major theme is the influence of changes or properties
in one part of the system on the qualitative status of other parts of
the system, a defining aspect of all exemplars of models informed by
general systems theory. Finally, the interaction of sectors of the E-E
unit is considered with respect to emergent social aspects in Barker's
system:
For a psychology defined in terms of E-E units, the usual considerations of motivation are not adequate. These considerations almost always make personal motives the whole story
of the energetics of behavior, and place them within the organism. But a unit is a unit; it is indivisible. When it is a psychological unit, the environment, the organism, and the behavior
are all involved, and energetics must occur in all of the parts.
Either the E-E unit is false, or motivation theory is too limited.
(Barker, 1960, p. 4)
Barker goes on to lay the groundwork for discussion of his theory of behavior settings by introducing some concepts that provide
the context for his central theses. In a later section he provides further elucidation of the relation between the "entity" and the "environment" elements of his model:
Ecology is concerned with relations between entity and environment. But before this statement has any useful meaning,
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entity and environment must be defined .... Where does each
entity end and its environment begin? .. .
. . . To clarify this problem, it is necessary to revert to the
levels of phenomena in science .... I have emphasized that the
essential distinction between levels is this: The laws, the explanations, which have been devised to account for occurrences
on one level are inadequate to explain occurrences on a different level, yet the levels are coupled systems. Another distinction
that is crucial for the definition of environment is that between
inside and outside. Every entity has a discriminable boundary;
what is within the boundary constitutes the entity's inside, and
what is without constitutes its outside .... The environment of
an entity is made up of those parts of the outside regions with
which the entity is coupled by laws on a different level from
those which govern the entity itself.
. . . Here, for ecological problems, is the basis for delimiting
an entity from its environment. The test is this: As we move
from any discriminable thing to more remote, surrounding
parts, a point is reached at which the governing laws, so far
as we know them, become incommensurate, yet the linkage
remains. This point marks the boundary of the entity and the
beginning of the environment. (Barker, 1960, pp. 7-8)
Barker asserts the desirability of taking the entire E-E continuum
as the crucial unit of analysis, rather than abstracting only elements
of it for psychological examination. He offers the study of psychological principles of learning as an example:
The field of learning is interesting in this connection. Learning
is usually interpreted as the process, par excellence, by which
the environment influences the organism and its behavior. This
is the predominant way, almost the only way, a culture is presumed to shape the personality and behavior of the individuals born into it. The facts of learning demonstrate, however,
as almost all learning theory recognizes, that even here the
organism is the locus of driving forces without which learning does not occur. Indeed, within the context of learning it
is, paradoxically, the behaving organism that endows the environment with behavior-controlling properties; the guiding
and coercing powers of the environment have been shown to
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depend upon what activities the organism has previously had
with it, and these depend more upon the organism than upon
the environment. Indeed, learning studies have demonstrated
that almost every discriminable part of the ecological environment can be coupled with almost every kind of behavior. This
is important information; it defines the range of an organism's
power to transform its connections with the ecological environment, and it implies that parts of the environment are almost
equipotential. ...
It will be clear now where ecology enters the environment-environment unit, which Brunswik took as the realm of
psychology. Psychological ecology deals with the relations between the nonpsychological sectors of this unit, governed by
the laws of geometry, chemistry, economics, etc., and the intrapersonal and the behavior sectors, governed by psychological
laws. (Barker, 1960, pp. 11-12)
He then attempts to formulate an account of how these incommensurable system elements might be related (or, at least, an approach
to a satisfactory understanding) by exploring earlier ideas of Fritz
Heider's.
Barker makes a gradual transition to his concept of behavior
settings. Because these ideas are readily available to the interested
reader, a detailed presentation will not be offered here. However,
one would highlight a particularly important element of his concepts concerning behavior settings: Barker highlights how behavior
settings are regions in a community that offer certain opportunities
and, along with these, require certain responsibilities. Furthermore,
there is a relation between the peopling of these settings and both
the number of responsibilities and the adequacy of performance that
can be expected to occur. This relation between the demands of a
given behavior setting and the impact on the behavior and life of the
individuals populating these settings seems very compatible with
more recent concepts.
Implications for the analysis of complex settings and behavior
are evident. Barker continues, in a section entitled "Theory of Behavior Settings":
Field studies in which I and my associates have been engaged, of the behavior of children in their natural habitats,
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have brought us to the hypothesis that under certain precisely
defined and frequently occurring conditions, people stand in
the relationship of media to behavior settings; and that under
certain other less common conditions, people stand in the relationship of things to behavior settings, imposing certain absolute constraints on them. This hypothesis brings some order
into data upon American-English differences in the behavior of
children and adults, into data upon differences in the behavior
of individuals in settings of different sizes, and into data concerning the behavioral consequences of physical disability. The
wide ramifications of these simple ideas suggest that they may
have a basic significance for psychology, and particularly for
the psychology of motivation ....
It is first necessary to describe behavior settings. When a
mother writes, "There is a baseball game in progress on the playground across the street," she does not refer to any individual's
behavior, but to the behavior of children en masse. The same is
true of a newspaper item which reports, "The annual fete held
in the St. Ambrose Church garden was a great success."
These are behavior settings. They are highly visible behavior phenomena; laymen mention them in conversation and in
writing as frequently as they do individual persons .... Here
are ... [some] behavior settings:
Streets and sidewalks
Kane's Grocery
Clifford's Drug Store
Gwyn Cafe
Pearl Cafe
Midwest State Bank
Of special relevance in the present connection, however,
are the following characteristics of settings:
1. Behavior settings involve ongoing patterns of extraindividual behavior whose identity and functioning are independent of the participation of particular persons.
2. A behavior setting has a circumjacent soma of physical objects: of walls, doors, fences, chairs, dishes, typewriters, ad
infinitum, arranged in a characteristic spatial pattern, at a
particular temporal and physical locus.
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3. Behavior settings are homeostatic systems; they normally
persist, often for years, at a relatively stable, characteristic
level. ...
A behavior setting is a behavior entity, but its laws of operation are not the laws of individual psychology ...
Most of what we know about behavior settings is simple
description, with any conceptualizations being not far removed from the surface appearance of settings. However, this
is enough to make a beginning in tracing the connections along
the Brunswikian unit which has its origins in this part of the
ecological environment. For our purposes, the self-regulatory
characteristic of behavior settings is crucial and must be considered further; it is this, indeed, which gives behavior settings,
under certain conditions, the position of things which impose
their own patterns on the people within them, who have the
position of media.
Behavior settings exhibit a stability-within-change, a persisting functional level which is due to a balance of many influences. Some of these issue from the larger community, some
are intrinsic to the setting itself, and some originate within the
individuals who populate the setting ...
. . . Forces operate in every setting. These multiple balanced
forces assure that the level of a setting is more stable than most
of its parts or conditions singly. One frequently occurring means
of balancing the forces and maintaining the homeostatic level of
a behavior setting is compensating for a deficiency in the number or docility of the parts of the medium by an increase in the
amount of energy applied to each of them, and vice versa. When
the media of a setting, the machinery, the tools, or the workmen,
for example, are in short supply, those available have to work
longer and/ or "harder." (Barker, 1960, pp. 15-21)
In the last section of his contribution, Barker discusses "People:
Media of Behavior Settings":
Six features of the relationship between people and behavior
settings must now be mentioned.
1. People are part of the inside manifold of behavior settings.
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2. Of all the attributes of settings, people are the sine qua non....
3. Each quasi-stationary level of a setting has its optimal population requirements ....
4. Of all the equipment and paraphernalia of a setting, people
are among the most immediately malleable and adjustable.
5. Different behavior settings on the same level of functioning,
and therefore with the same optimal population requirements, actually differ greatly in population ....
6. These five features of the relation between people and behavior settings emphasize the position of people as the media of behavior settings. This is true. However, there is one
important exception. When the number of people in a setting, its population, falls below the minimal number required by its homeostatic level, the setting will be modified.
(Barker, 1960, pp. 21-22)
He concludes:
Behavior settings with less than optimal people for their homeostatic levels are self-disciplining settings. The opportunities within them are matched by the obligations they contain .
. . . We sometimes call them self-discipline. In reality they are
controls built into the structure and the dynamics of the setting,
into the ecological environment. ...
I would like to close with two remarks: (1) Brunswik's
environment-environment unit appears to be subject to more
than empirical probabilistic laws, and (2) the ecological environment appears to be, especially, the seat of motivating influences. (pp. 48-49)
Barker's contribution-as is his body of scholarly work in general-is novel and interesting and would seem to have continuing
applications today. In particular, the growing acknowledgment that
community reintegration and quality of life are vitally important
ends of rehabilitation efforts and that rehabilitation cannot really be
considered a successful endeavor unless an individual is supported
to the point of maximal participation in the life of the community,
with the greatest degree of independence possible, leads inevitably
to the recognition that there must be a satisfactory awareness of the
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environment-the behavior settings and social/interpersonal environment to which an individual will be returning-before an optimal rehabilitation treatment plan can be developed and delivered.
Barker's (and his students') techniques for identifying and cataloging community venues can serve as a guide in expanding rehabilitation practice to include such analyses. In this regard, in addition
to Barker's work and the models of Brunswik and Heider (already
referenced), additional useful resources include Gibson (1979) and
Wicker (1984).

Notes
The editors would like to acknowledge and express a special thanks to Mr.
Joe Brown for his superlative work as copy editor of this volume of the Nebraska Symposium on Motivation. Mr. Brown's consistently resourceful and
creative suggestions concerning the substance, organization, and presentation of chapter materials contributed immeasurably to the clarity and coherence of the final product. As will be evident, the conceptual breadth of
material and diversity of perspectives reflected in this volume are considerable. Mr. Brown's timely and precise questions and observations, clear and
patient counsel, and unflagging good humor throughout were notably catalytic in successfully bringing the 52nd edition of the symposium together in
its present form. All volume editors should be so fortunate!
1. Compare Theodore Newcomb's" A-B-X" model, discussed below.
2. Variables such as curiosity, novelty, and stimulus change, stimulus aspects sometimes thought to provoke increased engagement, interest, and/ or
increase arousal.
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